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Abstract
This study analyses potential adverse eﬀects of unilateral increase in GHG
emission standards. The single good two regions partial equilibrium model of
international trade is used to derive and interpret the conditions under which
such an increase will lead to a reduction in a total level of GHG emission. We
found that improvement in the global GHG emission level will be observed if
the response of the home country abatement level is more elastic than that
of the foreign country by the factor of the ratio of initial foreign to domestic
marginal emission intensities. It is also shown that in the large industry case,
the appropriate factor is adjusted by the measure of the relative market in-
ﬂuence of two industries. The study concludes that a unilateral reduction in
GHG emissions will unlikely lead to the reduction in the total GHG emissions
level and may worsen the environmental situation in other regions. An appro-
priate multilateral agreement that involves producers from the major emitting
countries is required to achieve the goal.
Research in progress. Do not quote without authors’ permission.
1 Introduction
Since the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated and signed in 1997, 191 nations ratiﬁed
the agreement committing to a diﬀerent extent to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions over the deﬁned period of time. However, despite of the international eﬀorts,
the global level of GHG emissions continued to increase to 29.38 billion tonnes of CO2
equivalent in 2008 in comparison with 20.34 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent in 1990
1(International Energy Agency 2010). Only about 27% of the world GHG emissions are
contributed by the Annex I Kyoto parties and this share is decreasing at a persistent
rate of approximately 1% per year, while the combined share of China and India grew
from 14% to approximately 27% over 1990 – 2008. The U.S. remain one of the biggest
pollutant despite the success in reducing the GHG emission intensity from 0.69 to
0.48 kg of CO2 equivalent per $1 of GDP (see Fig. 3(b)) under its unilateral eﬀort.
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Figure 1: CO2 emissions by various parties.
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United States China EU India
Figure 2: CO2 emissions per capita by various parties.
Given that the number of countries are eﬀectively outside of the Kyoto agreement
or not committed to GHG reduction, the assessing the eﬀects of an unilateral policy
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United States China EU India
Figure 3: CO2 emissions per US dollar of GDP by various parties.
of regulating GHG emissions remains an important issue in terms of carbon leakage
and global emission level.
Using the general equilibrium model of international trade Copeland and Taylor
(2005) found that in an open economy setting the country’s best response to the
emission reduction in the rest of the world is not deﬁned due to a carbon leakage
and depends on the relative strength of free-riding, substitution and income eﬀects.
They concluded that it is thus possible for domestic emissions cuts to be an optimal
strategy in case of unilateral decrease in foreign emission level.
The recent literature on economics of GHG emissions regulation has strong fo-
cus on eﬀects of technology change on production and abatement decisions under
globalized trade environment. Assuming that abatement decisions are endogenous,
Golombek and Hoel (2004) model research and development activities as a part of
environmental policy, which is designed to minimize the total abatement costs. In a
static two-country one-product model framework they demonstrate that in a presence
of international technology spillovers the eﬀect of a carbon leakage is not necessarily
observed. The study demonstrates that it is possible for an increased environmental
concern in one country might lead to lower emissions in both countries. Di Maria
3and van der Werf (2008) suggest that the degree of carbon leakage reported in the
current economic literature may be overestimated as it does not take into account
the oﬀsetting induced-technology eﬀect created by the incentives to innovate, which
reduces carbon leakage.
The studies depend signiﬁcantly on a variety of underlying assumptions such as
the speciﬁcation of the GHG emission level within the consumer utility function
and the mechanism of the spillovers eﬀects that often yields ambiguous conclusions,
some of which are sensitive to particular assumption choices made by the authors.
Our research is focused on a more general problem of a feasibility of a success of a
unilateral policy by concentrating on the industry’s production, abatement and trade
decisions. We examine, within the proposed model framework, conditions under
which the unilateral domestic GHG emission regulation can successfully lead to a
global GHG level reduction. Speciﬁc questions such as an optimal environmental
tax choice and the mechanism of such a choice as well as the particular consumer
preferences are beyond the scope of this study as the more speciﬁc assumptions are
only expected to render the probability of success but not the general rules.
2 The Model
Consider the market for a single good produced in two regions, domestic and foreign,
indexed as i = 1,2 correspondingly. Both regions adopt the constant returns to scale
technologies that simultaneously generate two types of output: the desired good in
quantity qi and the undesired emissions ei. To model the possibility of abatement we
follow the approach suggested in Copeland and Taylor (2003) and denote 0 ≤ θi ≤
1 to be endogenous fraction of potential production qi allocated to the abatement
activities by the industry in each region and thus foregone from the market. Within
4the proposed model framework the eﬀect of the choice of θi on reduction of emission
levels ei is described as follows:
ei = ϕi(θi)qi i = 1,2 (1)
where ϕ′(θ) < 0, ϕ′′(θ) > 0. A higher level of θ reduces the emission intensity
ϕ(θ), however it does so at a decreasing rate making abatement less eﬃcient as more
potential output is used. Copeland and Taylor (2003) suggest the choice of abatement
function such that ϕ(0) = 1 and ϕ(1) = 0. The emission function (1) can itself be
seen as the production function for the undesired good ei that requires qi and θi as
inputs, implying that qi can also be treated as the intermediate good. The slope of
the isoquant curve can be evaluated by ﬁnding the total diﬀerential of (1) and setting








Assume that gi(qi) is the associated cost function, such that g′(q) > 0, g′′(q) > 0. For
further analysis each industry proﬁt πi is deﬁned in terms of the intermediate output
qi as
πi = pxi − gi(qi) − τiei(qi,θi) i = 1,2 (3)
where xi = (1 − θi)qi is the net production level and τi is per unit emission tax
set exogenously by the government in each nation. Similarly to (1) x(θi,qi) can be
approached as the production function for the ﬁnal product xi, where intermediate








5The world price p is deﬁned by the aggregate demand function
p = p(x1 + x2) (5)
such that p(x)′ < 0 and p(x)′′ > 0, that serves as the market clearing condition and
closes the model. Given the market size constraint, each nations’s industry seeks to
maximize its proﬁt by choosing the level of production qi and abatement activities
θi conditional on the emission reduction eﬀect deﬁned by the abatement technology
function ϕi(θi). We assume that the emissions taxation level is not prohibitive, and
q1 > 0 and q2 > 0 for any feasible change in the values of the exogenous parameters of
the model. Since we are only interested in interior solutions for production levels, the
corresponding optimal conditions for proﬁt maximization can be obtained from (3)
as
(1 − θi)(p
′xi + p) − g
′
i − τiϕi = 0 for xi > 0 i = 1,2 (6)
Because the abatement parameters θ1 and θ2 are constrained, the optimal condi-
tions for optimal abatement decisions can be obtained by solving the corresponding
mixed complementarity optimization problem in (3) that yields the following set of
equations:
qi(p
′xi + p) + τiϕ
′
iqi ≤ 0 ⊥ θi = 1 (7a)
qi(p
′xi + p) + τiϕ
′
iqi = 0 ⊥ 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1 (7b)
qi(p
′xi + p) + τiϕ
′
iqi ≥ 0 ⊥ θi = 0 (7c)
6The term g′
i captures indirect eﬀect of abatement activities on the production costs
of the net output xi, which is negative in case of increase in θi. Even though the
abatement decision does not enter the intermediate product cost function gi directly,
an increase in the proportion of the potential output θiqi that is used for abatement
activities and thus diverted from the market makes production of the every addi-
tional unit of the ﬁnal good more expensive since it requires a larger quantity of the
intermediate good as an input. In terms of the intermediate output qi, the adverse
eﬀect of an increase in θi is reﬂected in the decrease in the potential marginal market
revenue measured as pθi which is equivalent to the increase in the marginal oppor-
tunity cost. The indirect eﬀect of the abatement decision on the production costs
is balanced by the change in the emission costs burden through the change in the
intensity of emission demonstrated by the expression τiϕ′
i ∝ d(ϕi).
For suﬃciently small τi the complementarity condition (7c) suggests that the op-
timal level of coeﬃcient θi is equal to zero, implying that there is no incentive to
comply with the regulation since the marginal costs of running the abatement ac-
tivities exceed the marginal beneﬁts from the corresponding emission tax payment
reduction. When no regulation is enforced, τi = 0, (7c) is guaranteed to hold. On
contrary, according to (7a) as τi grows the regulation of industrial emissions reaches
eventually its prohibitive level leaving no incentive to stay on the market since all the
resources are diverted to the abatement activities. If both regions enforce their emis-
sion regulations by choosing the emission taxation level 0 < τi ≪ ∞ the proportion
of net output qi used for abatement activities will lie within the unit interval (0,1)
since there is no incentive to neither avoid reducing the emissions completely nor to
stop the production. In this case only condition (7b) is eﬀective for each region.
73 Analysis of unilateral domestic policy change
Assume that the region 1 makes a commitment to reduce the industrial emissions
by increasing the emission taxation level by an amount dτ1, while policy remains the
same in the region 2. If the domestic industry is too small to inﬂuence the world price
then the unilateral change in τ1 will lead to no change in the aggregate demand x∗
since the world price remains eﬀectively ﬁxed. Under dp = 0 the demand constrained
requires that dx1 = −dx2. Assuming both regions enforce their environmental policy
on some non prohibitive level, such that 0 < τ1 ≪ ∞ and 0 < τ2 ≪ ∞, the model
equilibrium can be described by using equations (6) and (7b) along with the demand
constraint and collecting the terms as
g
′
1 − p(1 − θ1) + τ1ϕ1 = 0 (8)
p + τ1ϕ
′
1 = 0 (9)
x1 + x2 = x
∗ (10)
p
′x2 + p + τ2ϕ
′
2 = 0 (11)
To facilitate the further analysis the total diﬀerentials of equations (8) and (9) with
respect to q1, θ1 and τ1 are obtained as:
g
′′
1dq1 + (p + τ1ϕ
′






Due to a price taking behaviour of the home country, equation (13) can be directly
solved for appropriate multiplier that describes the eﬀect of unilateral change in τ1









Note that the eﬀect of dθ1 is zeroed out in (12) due to optimality requirement (9),
implying the independence of production and abatement decisions under small in-













Using the deﬁnition of the net production level x the corresponding change in the
domestic market output level is
dx1 = (1 − θ1)dq1 − q1dθ1 =
q1ϕ′
1g′′






Note that although the home country equilibrium change is completely described
by the changes in domestic supply and abatement activities and the small country
assumption can’t inﬂuence the world price, the demand restriction (11) implies that
the appropriate reduction in x1 has to be compensated by an increase in the net
output for region 2, since dx2 = −dx1. In this situation the foreign industry may
also have an incentive to adjust it’s own abatement ratio θ2, reﬂecting an indirect
eﬀect of dτ1 > 0 that can be evaluated using the total diﬀerentials of the optimality










9However, since the change in x2 is insigniﬁcant, p′′x2 + 2p′ ≃ 0 and therefore
dθ2
dτ1 = 0
(which is equal to zero if region 2 industry is also small). Indeed, since both marginal
costs and marginal beneﬁts of foreign abatement activities (estimated per unit of
potential output qi) remain unchanged due to the constant price and no change in
foreign GHG emission regulation, there is no incentive to neither increase nor decrease
θ2. Hence dx2 = dq2 > 0.




> 0 and dψi =
1
(1 − θi)2(ϕi + ϕ
′
i(1 − θi))dθi (18)
where ϕi+ϕ′
i(1−θi) ≤ 0 by convexity of ϕi. Note, that an improvement in abatement
technology used by the industry implies that the same marginal emission level ϕ can
be achieved at a lower level of abatement activities requiring smaller portion of the





















i. By the deﬁnition of the net output emission
intensity (18) we have ψ∗
i < ψo
i implying that an abatement technology improvement
leads to reducing the level of marginal level of net output emissions ψ.
Given the emission function (1) the total change in domestic emission E1 due to
the unilateral increase in the taxation level dτ1 is
dE1 = ψ1dx1 +
x1
(1 − θ1)2(ϕ1 + ϕ
′








10to be the elasticity of the emission intensity ψ with respect to the net production
level x. Then (20) can be expressed in terms of η as
dE1 = ψ1dx1 + x1dψ1 = ψ1(1 + η1)dx1 < 0 (22)
Note that for region 2, dψ2 = 0, therefore η2 = 0 and
dE2 = ψ2dx2 + x2dψ2 = ψ2dx2 > 0 (23)
Using the deﬁnitions provided above the necessary condition for successful reduction
in the global level of GHG are described in the form of the following Theorem:
Theorem 3.1 (Necessary Condition) In small country case a unilateral increase
in τ1 will lead to reduction in total level of GHG emissions if and only if the following
holds




Proof Under the small industry assumption dx1 = −dx2. Let us assume that at
the initial equilibrium the home country industry employs the technology such that
δψ1 = ψ2 for some δ > 0. Combining this assumption with (22), (23) and the demand
restriction yields an equation for the eﬀect of unilateral increase of domestic emission



















Examining (25) suggests that the total emission level will not increase if and only if
11the following condition holds
1 + η1 ≥ δ (26)
for small country case.
Intuitively Theorem 3.1 suggests that domestic emission function needs to be elastic
enough at the initial equilibrium level of θ1 to be able to compensate for the cor-
responding change in the net output and the resulting increase in the foreign GHG
emission level given the diﬀerence in the initial emission intensities in two regions.
In a particular case that τ1 > 0 and τ2 = 0 (the foreign industry is not regulated)
Theorem 3.1 requires that




for the desired improvement in emission level, since θ2 = 0 and ψ2 = 1. As discussed
in the previous section the absence of GHG regulation or, more speciﬁcally, regulation
enforcement leaves no incentives to intensify the abatement activities beyond 0 leading
to the highest possible emission intensity level ψ2 and therefore the largest possible
diﬀerence δ given the domestic abatement level and technology available in both
regions. As the result, signiﬁcantly bigger eﬀorts by domestic industry are required
to compensate for increasing foreign GHG emissions to achieve the success.
Here, and in our further analysis of unilateral regulation policy, the relative size
of the initial emission intensities as measured by a parameter δ proved to be crucial.
The following result based on the particular combinations of the initial values of ψ1
and ψ2 provides an important additional insight on the viability of unilateral actions
in the area of the GHG emission regulation:
Corollary 3.2 (Suﬃcient Condition) Under assumptions of Theorem 3.1 ψ1 >
12ψ2 is the suﬃcient condition for reduction in total level of GHG emissions in case of
the unilateral increase in τ1. Converse is not necessarily true.
Proof By deﬁnition, ψ1 > ψ2 implies δ < 1. Using the fact that η ≥ 0 yields
the corresponding lower bound for condition for successful reduction in total GHG
emission level,
1 + η1 ≥ 1 (28)
Hence (26) is guaranteed if ψ1 > ψ2. However, the upper bound is always greater
or equal 1 and therefore ψ1 < ψ2 is not suﬃcient for increase in total level of GHG
emissions.
If the abatement technology diﬀusion is possible, it is expected that the emission
intensities in both regions will converge to the level which is lower of the two, as
discussed in the previous section. In the light of the Theorem 3.1 such an outcome
implies that the assumed gap will decrease so that δ = 1 reducing possible carbon
leakage by the factor δ (see eq. (23)) and improving the chance of reducing the global
level of GHG emissions. Furthermore, if the abatement technology diﬀusion is perfect,
i.e. ψ1 = ψ2, the success of the unilateral domestic policy is guaranteed by the
conclusion of Corollary 3.2.
When both countries have market power the analysis becomes more complex as
both the world price and demand are going to react to the unilateral domestic emission
policy change accordingly in order to adjust to the new equilibrium. Diﬀerentiating
the proﬁt functions for both industries and collecting the terms yields the following set




1 + (1 − θ1)τ1ϕ
′
1 + τ1ϕ1 = 0 (29)
p
′x1 + p + τ1ϕ
′
1 = 0 (30)
g
′
2 + (1 − θ2)τ2ϕ
′
2 + τ2ϕ2 = 0 (31)
p
′x2 + p + τ2ϕ
′
2 = 0 (32)
Again the total diﬀerentiation of (29) – (32) is required in order to evaluate the eﬀect
of dτ1 > 0 on q1, θ1, q2 and θ2 given dτ2 = 0. Let ai = p′′xi + 2p′ < p′′xi + p′ < 0
and bi = τiφ′′
i > 0. Then, in the matrix notation, the result can be represented as











1 b1(1 − θ1) 0 0
(1 − θ1)a1 −q1a1 + b1 (1 − θ2)(a1 − p′) −q2(a1 − p′)
0 0 g′′
2 b2(1 − θ2)





















































Using the results of appendix A, the eﬀect of the change in emission tax level τ1 on


























Equations (33) and (34) indicate that the qualitative eﬀects are similar to the small
industry case. However, the eﬀect of increase in domestic tax τ1 on intermediate pro-
duction decision of home industry is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength
of tax burden and price change prior to the new policy introduction which deﬁnes the
sign of b1 − a1q1. In the case that the latter quantity is positive, dq1 < 0 since the









1q1 − ϕ1b1(1 − θ1))[g′′
2b2 − a2 (g′′












1q1 − ϕ1b1(1 − θ1))(a2 − p′)(g′′
2q2 + b2(1 − θ2)2)
detA
> 0 (36)
Note that in general dx1  = dx2, i.e. dx2/dx1  = 1, due to the diﬀerence in the response
of supply to the price change in each of the regions. However, based on (35) and (36)
it can be shown that −1 ≤ dx2/dx1 ≤ 0. For convenience, let ǫ denote the elasticity







As in the small industry case, the necessary conditions for the reduction in the global
level of GHG emissions can be stated in the form of the following Theorem:
15Theorem 3.3 (Necessary Condition) In large country case a unilateral increase











Proof Using the deﬁnitions (21) and (37) the total change in the emission level due









= ψ1(1 + η1)
dx1
dτ1












where si is the market share for region i production. In this case, the emission level







for large country case.
The result above is the generalization of the Theorem 3.1 for the large country case.
Here the success threshold value is smaller δǫ
s2
s1 ≤ δ due to the partial adjustment
of the market output. However the change in price in response to the production
shift may lead to a corresponding decrease in a foreign country abatement activities
level (η2  = 0) and therefore the actual success will depend on the relative size of
these eﬀects. In general, it is not possible to derive a large country equivalent of the
Corollary (3.2) unless more speciﬁc assumptions are made.
164 Concluding remarks
This study examines the feasibility of success of unilateral GHG emission reduction
policy in an open economy where abatement decisions of the ﬁrms are endogenous
in a sense of Copeland and Taylor (2003). The analysis is carried out using a static
single good two-country partial equilibrium model with a focus on the production
and trade considering both small and large industry assumptions.
The results indicate that unilateral GHG regulation decreases domestic produc-
tion due to the increased costs associated with the undesired output. An implied
additional production costs resulting form of an environmental tax can signiﬁcantly
reduce the competitiveness of the domestic industries under unilateral environmental
policies, compared to the foreign regions where producers operate under low or no en-
vironmental regulations. It is shown that if the foreign region is not cooperating and
remains outside of the GHG emissions regulation agreement the domestic products
will be substituted in the international market by the similar foreign goods regardless
of the size of both industries, leading to a carbon leakage phenomena.
Our analysis suggests that in the case that the foreign industry uses a signiﬁ-
cantly inferior abatement technology which assumes higher emission intensity, such
a shift in the production under a unilateral policy of regulating GHG emissions can
lead to an increase in a global GHG emissions, indicating a failure of the unilateral
domestic environmental regulation policy. Moreover, a corresponding higher resource
requirements can create an incentive for reducing the level of foreign abatement activ-
ities that would further increase an environmental damage in the regions that remain
outside of the GHG emission regulation agreement.
Theoretically derived conditions for success of the unilateral domestic GHG emis-
sion regulation policy proposed in this study require that the industries abatement
17response to the tax shock to be signiﬁcantly higher than that of the foreign region in
order to compensate an increase in the overall emission intensity due to the diﬀerences
in abatement technologies. This task can be achieved by adjusting the industry costs
through the direct or indirect measures such as subsidies or border tax adjustments.
Both approaches are being favoured to a certain extent however an eﬃcient imple-
mentation of such policies is complicated due to their essentially protective nature.
In a more general quasi-unilateral case, when “domestic” and “foreign” regions are
represented by the industries in the countries that are in or outside of the Kyoto
type agreement, respectively, the same logic can be applied, i.e. it is required that
the major polluting regions to be an active participants in the global GHG emission
regulation thus satisfying the conditions for a success of such an agreement.
A Comparative statics analysis of unilateral tax increase for
large country case
Using Laplace expansion the determinant of A can be evaluated as









1q1 + b1(1 − θ1)







2q2 + b2(1 − θ2)
2  
















i bi − ai (g′′
i qi + bi(1 − θi)2)] > (ai − p′)(g′′
i qi + bi(1 − θi)2).
Let Aq1 and Aq2 denote the matrices A with the columns of the corresponding
18variables replaced with vector λ. The determinants for such matrices are found to be
detAq1 = (λ11A22 − A12λ21)(A33A44 − A43A34) + λ11A42(A23A34 − A33A24)










2q2 + b2(1 − θ2)
2  
+ (a1 − p
′)q1 (ϕ1 + ϕ
′









detAq2 = λ11A34(A22A41 − A21A42) + λ22A34(A11A42 − A41A12)
= ϕ
′





1q1 + b1(1 − θ1)
2 
− (ϕ1 + ϕ
′
1(1 − θ1))b2(1 − θ2)(1 − θ1)(a2 − p
′)b1





1q1 − ϕ1(1 − θ1)b1) > 0 (43)
By analogy, let Aθ1 and Aθ2 denote the matrices A with the columns of the corre-
















2q2 + b2(1 − θ2)
2  
+ (a1 − p
′)(1 − θ1)(ϕ1 + ϕ
′









detAθ2 = λ11A33(A21A42 − A22A41) + λ22A33(A12A41 − A42A11)
























1q1 − ϕ1(1 − θ1)b1) < 0 (45)
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